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Chapter 5 
Availability and Shortages of Teachers in Higher Education 
Chiranjib Sen 
Higher education occupies a central place in India’s growth and development. The sector has 
expanded rapidly, being fuelled by rising demands emanating structurally from India’s 
demographic structure, as millions of new potential job seekers entering college-going age, look 
towards higher education as a means to better their opportunities. As the Indian economy has 
grown more rapidly and liberalized, the economic role of higher education has also evolved. This 
has led to a greater emphasis on professional and technical education both from the students as 
well as policy makers. To meet this demand, the Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) have 
expanded recently in numbers, size and diversity. To take a longer perspective, the expansion of 
the Indian HEI system has taken place historically in three waves. This evolutionary process has 
shaped the institutional composition of HE providers, as well as the nature of demand for teaching 
faculty.  
During the first wave of expansion in the second and third decades of the planning era, central 
government policy was the main driver of HE expansion. A set of new institutions were established 
with government funding—the Central Universities, the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), the 
Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs), the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) and 
the Regional Engineering Colleges (RECs). During the mid-1980s, the second wave of expansion 
brought the emergence of private institutions. These were mainly private sector-run professional 
colleges, which were located particularly in some states, such as Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, 
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. During the 1990s, another phase of accelerated expansion began, 
and this process is still unfolding. Driven by the policy of economic liberalization, as well as the 
demographic bulge in the college-age population, there has been a sharp expansion in the number 
of new universities and technical and professional institutions in both the private and the public 
sector. The latter includes the recent dramatic increase in the number of new IITs, IIMs and AIIMS 
across the country. This urgency as well as the institutional composition of intensification of HE 
reflect the emergence of scientific, technical and professional education as strategic priorities to 
deal with the economic challenges of globalization. The new international economic system 
requires such branches of knowledge for industries and professions to remain competitive in the 
global economy.  
This vast expansion of the Indian HE system has necessitated a commensurate demand for 
appropriately skilled faculty members. For some years now, concern has been growing among 
higher education policymakers and administrators about the adequate availability of faculty 
resources. There is a general acknowledgement of a “shortage of faculty”, despite the lack of 
comprehensive and reliable quantitative data. Efforts to cope with the faculty shortage have led to 
the appointment of ad hoc teaching staff in both public and private universities on a large scale. 
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This development has created a tension between the quantity and the quality of higher education 
produced in the country. 
The Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD), Government of India constituted a Task 
Force on Faculty Shortage and Design of Performance Appraisal System to examine the 
matter.1The Task Force submitted its report in 2011 in which it observed that the shortage of 
faculty in the Indian HE system had already reached a critical level. This opinion was supported 
by the uniformly expressed views of the vice-chancellors and regulators who met with the Task 
Force. While noting that this was a “rough estimate” due to paucity of data, the Task Force stated 
that the shortage was approximately 380 thousand teachers (or 50 per cent of sanctioned positions). 
It is also observed that the scarcity was likely to worsen further during the coming decade, and 
reach 1.3 million.2 Hence the matter needs urgent policy attention (MHRD, 2011).  
Faculty availability had been a source of longstanding concern long before the problem assumed 
critical dimensions. Prior to the Task Force, several committees commented in passing on the 
faculty shortage question though they did not study the problem systematically. They tended to 
view this as a supply-side problem, and suggested ways to increase and/or retain teaching faculty. 
This included the G.K. Chadha Committee to Review the Pay Scales and Service Conditions of 
University and College Teachers (for the 6th Pay Commission). Even as early as 1964, the Kothari 
Commission had expressed concern that scholars of high potential might be discouraged from 
joining the teaching profession because of the unattractive working environment in academic 
institutions. 
Gauging faculty shortage and structural issues identified by expert groups 
The Task Force attempted to assess the quantitative extent of faculty shortage. It soon realized that 
there was a severe paucity of reliable data. The major regulatory bodies did not possess data and 
hence were unable to provide much information. The data available with the UGC were dated and 
highly incomplete. Hence, the Task Force attempted to conduct a survey on its own. Unfortunately, 
the data that could be collected was limited mainly due to the short time available. Nonetheless, 
the Task Force drew some tentative conclusions from the limited data that it was able to gather. It 
found that in the Central Universities, on an average 35 per cent of faculty positions were vacant. 
In several cases, the shortage exceeded 50 per cent. The gap was high in some leading universities 
—e.g. Delhi University had a shortage of 53 per cent. However, in a few central universities the 
situation was comfortable (e.g. Vishwa-Bharati, Assam University, Aligarh Muslim University, 
                                                          
1Hereinafter we shall refer to this committee as the Task Force. Prof. Sanjay Dhande was Chairperson. The present 
author served as a member. This chapter draws on the report of the Task Force, and in particular on the analytical 
framework chapter to which he contributed. Other members of the Task Force were Prof. Devi Singh, Prof. V. 
Kannan, Prof. K.K. Aggarwal, Dr. R.K. Chauhan and Dr. Niloufer A. Kazmi. 
2MHRD, 2011, Preamble, p x. According to the All India Survey on Higher Education 2013-14, the total number of 
teachers is approximately 1368 thousand in higher education. 
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Jamia Millia Islamia University).With respect to the State Universities, the average shortage in the 
77 universities that responded to the Task Force survey was 33 per cent. However, in 25 per cent 
of the responding universities the faculty shortage was above 50 per cent, and in another 18 percent 
of the responding universities the figure was above 40 per cent. The situation was alarming in 
some state universities which had over 70 per cent of unfilled positions.3 
Viewing the faculty shortage problem in relation to the size of enrolment, the average student to 
teacher ratio was found to be 20.9. This compares unfavourably with the UGC norms, which is 
13.5 (with 15 for undergraduate and 12 for postgraduate programs). The Task Force thus estimated 
that the faculty size should be increased by 54 per cent of the existing strength in order to bring it 
on par with the norm. To fill the data gap, the MHRD has recently launched the All India Survey 
on Higher Education (AISHE), which provides more recent information on various aspects of 
higher education. According to the AISHE 2013-14 Report, the All-India figure for the Pupil - 
Teacher Ratio (PTR) for Universities and Colleges in the Regular Mode (i.e., excluding Distance 
Education) remained at 21 (MHRD, 2015). This confirms and validates the estimate made by the 
Task Force. The AISHE data shed additional light on the regional variation. There is a very wide 
variation in the PTR across the states, which implies a corresponding disparity in faculty shortage. 
Bihar (54) and Jharkhand (55) show very high PTR, followed by Uttar Pradesh (38) and West 
Bengal (37).  The faculty resource position is grave in these states, as they are very far from the 
UGC norms. On the other side of the spectrum, we have states where the overall faculty availability 
is comfortable. These are Sikkim (11), Karnataka (13), and Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Andhra 
Pradesh (14 each) (MHRD, 2015). 
To summarise, the available quantitative evidence confirms that there exists an overall shortage of 
faculty. Precise measurement of its magnitude remains difficult. If it is measured as the proportion 
of unfilled positions, the average national shortage is about 35 per cent. If, however, it is assessed 
in terms of the shortfall from UGC norms on pupil-teacher ratios, the average shortage is 54 per 
cent. There is a large disparity across regions, as well as across universities. Many institutions with 
alarming faculty shortages are state universities. However, perhaps surprisingly, some of the 
leading central universities also have high faculty shortage. There are significant variations in the 
faculty shortage in specific academic domains.   
For policy making, these quantitative estimates of faculty shortage need to be complemented with 
an understanding of how the Indian higher education system actually functions. We present such 
an understanding which is gleaned from the observations of various expert committees, as well as 
from the insights that senior higher education administrators and regulators shared with the Task 
Force. These judgements and insights convey a sense of the prevailing ‘ground realities’ and 
decision making environment affecting faculty resource availability. We have grouped these 
                                                          
3MHRD 2011, Chapter 3. 
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observations into three categories—(a) Factors affecting the supply motives of faculty resources, 
(b) Demand-side perspectives; and (c) Regulatory and policy context. 
(a) Supply side factors 
Given India’s population size and long tradition of higher education, there exists a large pool of 
potential teachers. However, the requisite skills are scarce and there are alternative professional 
options for potential teachers. Hence, the central issue is whether the teaching profession is 
adequately attractive for qualified and talented professionals. The diagnosis of inadequate supply 
has generally rested on (i) salaries, and (ii) academic working environment. The Chadha 
Committee (UGC 2008) held that the problem of faculty shortage needs to be addressed by offering 
adequate pecuniary incentives so that competent individuals are motivated to join the teaching 
profession. In the early decades following independence, salaries were perhaps less important. 
Arguably many teachers were attracted by the dignity, intellectual freedom and respect associated 
with the teaching profession. However, after the 1991 market reforms pecuniary considerations 
carry more weight in career decisions of skilled professionals. This is particularly true because 
salaries have skyrocketed in the globalized and/or newly commercialized professions such as 
information technology, law, management and medicine. The globalization of the skilled labour 
services market is a relatively recent structural change in the Indian economy, and it is a key driver 
of income inequality. The desire for some parity between teacher and other professional salaries 
therefore plays a key role in career choices of potential teachers.  
The Goverdhan Mehta Committee (MHRD, 2009) titled ‘The Pay Committee for Faculty and 
Scientific/Design Staff of Central Technical Institutes’ pointed out a different supply-side 
structural constraint—not enough PhD degree holders are being produced in the country, who are 
qualified to teach in technical and professional institutions. Moreover, very few of even the small 
numbers who possess the required qualifications are joining the teaching profession. So, 
motivating new entrants to teaching is an important problem that must be addressed. 
What about those who are already in the teaching profession, and their willingness and ability to 
perform? With regard to the academic working environment for in-service teachers, the Kothari 
Commission had long ago noted specifically certain features that affect motivation. These go far 
beyond salaries. This includes the feeling of isolation experienced by ‘thinly spread’ research-
oriented faculty members and hence the lack of stimulating interaction with colleagues, heavy 
teaching loads, classes of large size with ‘unchallenging students’ and academic administrators 
who consciously or unconsciously discourage intellectual vitality and motivation. Citing the 1964 
report, the Task Force remarked on the continuing validity of the observations today. These 
considerations make us realize that, even though economic factors are important, teaching cannot 
be treated merely as a skilled, commodified service to be bought and sold.  
The act of teaching embodies a significant component of individual performance akin to the 
performing arts. Here skill, inspiration, autonomy, research activity, intellectual renewal and 
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creativity are extremely important. The notion of a good academic work environment includes 
these subtle but difficult to quantify elements, the significance of which administrators may not 
fully grasp. The ongoing process of commercialization of higher education has tended to further 
marginalize such aspects. Hence, while adequate physical infrastructure of buildings, IT and 
library resources are important, these are still not sufficient to produce quality education. If 
quantity of teaching services is increased at a substantial cost of quality, it would defeat the very 
social and economic purpose of higher education policy. 
Finally, maintaining a good working environment over the longer run for in-service teachers also 
includes having a credible system of performance appraisal and promotion to support the career 
path of teachers. The Task Force examined this matter in some depth, reviewed the findings of 
earlier committees and made detailed recommendations for design of an appraisal system. This 
system has several components—Teaching & Learning Activities; Co-curricular and Professional 
Development Activities; and Research-related Activities.  
(b) Demand-side perspective 
While acknowledging that supply-side issues constraining the availability of faculty are important, 
we must recognize the important role of demand. This is an aspect that has not received sufficient 
attention. Not only has the demand-supply gap for faculty been rising rapidly in recent years, the 
composition of demand has been changing significantly. Hence the shortage of faculty may be 
more acute in some programmes and associated disciplines than in others. For example, demand 
is booming in fields like engineering and management, whereas it is relatively stagnant in 
traditional disciplines like liberal studies and humanities. Moreover, the problem of faculty 
shortage is not only a matter of assuring sufficient number of teaching hours. The problem of 
quality is closely intertwined with it, because attempting to stretch the quantity of teachers 
inevitably affects the quality of education. Higher education policy makers and administrators 
attempting to increase the availability of faculty resources need therefore to keep in mind the 
inseparable relationship between quantity and quality of education services. There might arise a 
situation where HEIs must trade-off quality vis-à-vis quantity, and this condition should be 
avoided. The Task Force observed that the quality of Indian higher education is ‘patchy’ and 
‘uneven’. In this chapter, we analyse the problem of faculty availability and shortage within a 
framework that integrates both the demand and supply perspectives.  
The Task Force adopted an economic analysis approach, which we follow in this chapter. In our 
view the economic motivation has become crucial to both the demand and supply of faculty 
resources. We need to explicitly consider how the higher education institutions determine their 
demand for faculty resources by the higher education institutions. Failure to account for the 
underlying economic pressures can lead to the frustration of well-meaning policy and regulatory 
steps. Thus there is a need to bring the complex and multidimensional elements that determine the 
availability and deployment of faculty resources into a simplified and coherent framework. A chain 
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of economic relations and causation determines the market demand for faculty. In the first stage, 
there is a demand for higher education itself which emanates from the student-age population. This 
is reflected in the demand for seats in HEIs. The HEIs in turn respond to this demand for higher 
education by making operational decisions regarding admissions, programs, facilities and faculty 
resources. The consequent demand for faculty resources is one element in the operating strategy 
of HEIs. As discussed elaborately in the next section, the nature of demand for faculty resources 
differs across different types of HEIs. The demand depends on the sources of their operating funds, 
and specifically on the relative importance of tuition fees, government support, endowment 
incomes, research grants, and so on.  
While bringing in this economic behaviour perspective, we remain conscious that higher education 
is not a commodity in the standard sense. Nevertheless, we believe that keeping the economic 
dimension in mind will lead to a more nuanced formulation of policies. In this way, the broader 
social goals can be maintained, and hopefully policies that curb the possible negative features of 
‘over-commercialization’ can be pursued.  
(c) The regulatory and policy context 
Senior functionaries (Heads or Chairpersons) of a large number of regulatory bodies and 
universities met with the Task Force to discuss the faculty availability scenario. Their evidence 
covering a variety of higher education domains is summarized below. 4  It sheds light on the 
structural changes in the system, and especially the significant effect that the large scale entry of 
the private sector institutions is having on the faculty resource scenario across a broad spectrum 
of HEIs: 
(i) There is an incidence of faculty shortage in both Central government-funded and State 
government-funded higher education institutions. This problem can actually be traced back to 
a de-facto ban on new recruitment and even on the filling up of existing sanctioned teaching 
positions. The underlying reason was a resource crunch on government budgets. However, 
surprisingly even after the ban was eased many Centrally-funded institutions have continued 
to neglect faculty recruitment. Thus, the perceived faculty shortage is a result of both a policy 
decision regarding higher education funding, as well as institution-level decisions. These 
decisions have constrained the demand for faculty by the HEIs. This has manifested as a 
‘faculty shortage’ as student enrolments have risen. In several state–government funded 
institutions across the country (e.g., Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Bihar) the situation was 
allowed to worsen drastically. It is not obvious why exactly the HEIs behaved as they have 
even after the hiring freeze was withdrawn. Hence, it is all the more important to analyse the 
determinants of the HEIs’ demand for faculty resources.  
                                                          
4Chapter 2 (MHRD, 2011).  
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(ii) With regard to the faculty-resource creation pipeline, doctoral programs are weak, partly 
because there are not sufficient funds for doctoral and post-doctoral fellowships. In 
government owned Teacher Education Institutions (TEI) there is a 25% shortfall in faculty 
resources, and private sector institutions have entered the domain. 
(iii)Both public sector and private sector function in tandem in medical education. However, there 
are more private sector institutions entering the sector. Faculty shortage is experienced in the 
older established public sector medical colleges. We may infer that there is competition for 
faculty resources between the older government medical colleges and the newly emerging 
private medical colleges, in which government colleges are losing out. 
(iv) In the case of dental colleges, the regulator (Dental Council of India) highlighted the weak and 
ineffective position of the regulator. The Council is apparently short of staff, and has no ‘teeth’ 
to regulate either the numbers of students admitted, or the faculty strength. Over 88 per cent of 
the dental colleges are in the private sector, and they cannot be effectively regulated. They do 
not provide up to date information on their faculty strength. Indeed, they often provide 
unreliable and misleading information to the regulator. For example, the name of the same 
individual might appear on the list of ‘full-time faculty’ in more than one institution. While on 
paper, there is no faculty shortage, the DCI estimated the de-facto shortage to be between 30 
to 35 per cent. 
(v) The All India Council on Technical Education (AICTE) stated that the shortage in technical 
education (covering a wide gamut of disciplines—engineering, management, pharmacy, 
architecture, hotel management, etc.) was very acute. This was so especially at the senior 
faculty level. There were 150 thousand teachers in position, against an actual requirement of 
300 thousand teachers (i.e., a 50 per cent shortfall).  
(vi) The situation was less extreme in legal education. There was no overall faculty shortage. 
However, it was difficult to find ‘qualified faculty’ as per the prevailing eligibility criteria. To 
meet the situation, the Bar Council of India (BCI) had relaxed some eligibility criteria in order 
to expand the pool of available teachers. It did not insist on the LLM degree as an essential 
qualification for teaching, and practicing advocates were encouraged to teach. 
(vii) Several Vice-Chancellors shared their views and experience with the Task Force. They 
confirmed that most universities had not recruited faculty ‘for decades’. Government funding 
has been a constraint, and they felt that Central government support to supplement the 
resources of State government might ease the situation. They roughly estimated an overall 
shortfall of faculty amounting to 35 to 40 per cent, while it was worse at the senior faculty 
level.  
 
8 
 
(viii) A recurrent theme on which there was uniform agreement was that recruiting ‘quality faculty’ 
was a difficult task. We conclude from this that the problem of faculty shortage as experienced 
by the HEIs was not that of receiving an inadequate number of applications for a teaching post 
during a recruitment exercise. The applicants do not have the desired and expected level of 
quality and competence for the academic task at hand. This confirms the observation made 
earlier that the doctoral and post-doctoral programs in the country are extremely weak. 
Inadequate availability of quality faculty raises a larger question: Are the students graduating 
from such programs ‘employable’ as teachers in standard academic programmes? In many 
instances, this situation had resulted in ‘inbreeding’ in faculty appointments—as departments 
absorbed their own outgoing students. Resorting to temporary and ad hoc appointments had 
also tended to compromise the quality of teaching as individuals with adequate quality opt for 
permanent position or to other lucrative professions  
Faculty availability and shortage through an economic lens 
As noted above, faculty shortage is commonly assessed by policy makers and academic 
administrators as the proportion of unfilled positions to sanctioned faculty positions. This is useful 
as a rule of thumb, but it is an imperfect measure of faculty shortage. The ‘sanctioned posts’ for 
any institution are administratively set. They remain fixed for relatively long periods of time and 
serve as an upper limit on recruitment. This measure does not help to understand the actual reasons 
for the faculty shortage, nor do they indicate whether the institutions intend to fill the ‘gap’. 
Without an analysis based on behavioural functioning of the higher education institutions, policy 
response to the problem could go wrong. As part of our contribution to the Task Force, we had 
developed a simple analytical framework through which we may examine the faculty shortage 
question using an economic lens. We draw on this framework to present below the essential logical 
structure of this framework, as well as some of the key insights that follow from this perspective.5 
From an economic standpoint higher education services constitute an ‘output’. This output is 
demanded by students, and supplied by the HEIs. Faculty resource is one among several ‘inputs’ 
that are required to produce higher education. Hence to analyse faculty shortage and availability, 
we need to see first how the demand for faculty resources by the HEIs is derived from the 
underlying market for higher education services. The demand for higher education at the aggregate 
level depends on three broad determinants—(a) the size of the student-age population 
(demographic structure), (b) tuition fees charged to students, and (c) ‘desired gross enrolment 
ratio’ (Sen, 2013). The desired GER is a parameter that summarizes the attractiveness of higher 
education to potential students. This parameter in turn depends on expected economic growth 
trends, as well as the social status associated with academic qualifications. High economic growth 
results in more favourable job prospects and high salaries on graduation. This increases the demand 
                                                          
5Chapter 4  (MHRD, 2011).  
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for higher education from the student-age population, i.e., it increases the ‘desired gross enrolment 
ratio’ in the population. Thus, the demand relationship for higher education is described as follows: 
DE = f(S; Gd; PE), where 
DE is the demand for higher education, S is the proportion of student age population in the total, 
Gd is the desired GER, and PE is the price of education. If S and Gd rise, DE would rise. If these 
parameters remain constant, the demand for higher education is inversely related to the tuition 
fees, as in a normal demand function. While from an economic standpoint, the price of higher 
education (tuition fee) is a crucial determinant of the demand for higher education, in actual 
practice there may be regulatory constraints on the possible tuition fee. The same logic can be 
applied at a more disaggregated level to predict the demand for individual postgraduate 
programmes and academic disciplines. Demand for such programs would depend on the relevant 
tuition fees, while the desired enrolment ratio would reflect the job prospects and expected incomes 
in specific domains (e.g. engineering or management, and so on).  
Having assessed the demand, the HEIs supply the higher education services. Their supply 
decisions include the following: (a) the quantum and composition of higher education that they 
will provide during the period.6 (b) The number of faculty members that would be utilized for 
delivering the chosen programmes, and the number of new faculty members to be recruited. This 
latter magnitude represents the demand for faculty resources by an HEI. How do the HEIs make 
these decisions? We postulate that the HEIs behave in an economically rational manner so as to 
attain their institutional goals. They have two independent goals—(a) Maximize Net Operating 
Income; and (b) Maximize Institutional Reputation. These goals reflect their short term and long 
term institutional objectives respectively. HEIs attempt to find an optimum combination of these 
two objectives, subject to a number of constraints that they face. These constraints include 
infrastructure constraints, regulatory norms, government policy directives, and the size of the 
operating budget.  
Net operating income is the difference between income flows and recurring costs.7 With economic 
liberalization, rising costs and stagnant or shrinking grants, generating a net surplus has become 
an important goal for all categories of HEIs. Institutional Reputation is difficult to measure 
directly. It is gradually created over a longer period by sustained performance and expenditures on 
a number of activities. These include providing high-quality education in widely respected 
academic programmes, good job market acceptance of graduates and the recognition of the 
                                                          
6The quantum of higher education is measured by the size of student intake and hence the planned number of students 
graduating with degrees. Composition refers to the mix of programs being offered, and the size of enrolment in each 
program. 
7Income is obtained from tuition and other fees paid by students, as well as from other sources, such as income from 
endowment investments, grants, funded research and consulting activities. From this we subtract recurring costs to 
get the net operating income.  
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Institution’s research and faculty quality. This goal requires investment on infrastructure, as well 
as on maintaining a good academic work environment. There is a very close association between 
institutional reputation and the quality of education that an institution is able to deliver. 
Institutional reputation pays off in the long run through the ability to attract good students, as well 
as to recruit and retain good faculty resources, and to obtain financial grants, earn consultancy 
income, and to build endowment funds. It enables the HEIs to fulfil the broader goals of higher 
education, which is difficult to do under conditions of commercialization, where the main focus is 
on generating profit. High institutional reputation also enables publicly funded HEIs to have a 
higher degree of operating flexibility and academic autonomy with regard to regulatory treatment. 
They tend to have greater flexibility in the operating characteristics of HEIs. The relative weights 
that they assign to each of these goals vary depending on the type of HEI. Moreover, the age of 
the institution is another important determinant. A new institution may have to devote more 
attention to reputation-building efforts. In general, there is likely to be a trade-off between the two 
objectives of net income and institutional reputation given limited operating budget for the HEI.  
The Indian higher education sector contains a very wide variety of institutional types. According 
to the AISHE 2013-14 survey report (MHRD, 2015), there are 723 universities, 36634 colleges 
and 11664 Stand Alone Institutions8. Out of these, 248 are affiliating universities, i.e., they provide 
the degrees for colleges under them and 219 universities are privately managed. Some of the 
universities are specialized by discipline--398 of the universities have  General programs, 90 are 
Technical universities, 61 universities offer Agriculture & Allied courses, 43 are Medical, 20 
Law,11 Sanskrit, 7 Language and 56 ‘other’ Universities. The colleges are also quite diverse with 
respect to their ownership and management--75% of the colleges are privately managed; 60% are 
Private-unaided and 15% are Private- aided institutions. The objective functions of each of these 
types of HEIs would vary depending on their operating context. However, our framework is 
general and may be adapted to each context by assigning an appropriate weight to each of these 
components of the institutional objective function. For example, a commercially oriented privately 
managed HEI would assign a very high weight to generating a net operating income, and a very 
low weight to institutional reputation. This would translate into choice of and/or discrimination in 
favour of academic programmes where high tuition fees can be charged. By contrast, a well-
endowed public institution with adequate and assured financial support from the government 
would be less concerned with earning a surplus from teaching activity. 
The supply behaviour of the HEIs may be conceptualized in the following terms. Let us first 
abstract from the quality-quantity trade-off.9  We assume that the HEI is maintaining its desired 
quality-quantity balance. It supplies a certain quantity of higher education services (measured by 
the number of students graduating) in accordance with its objective function. As tuition fees rise, 
the HEI increases the supply of higher education. However, the responsiveness of quantity of 
                                                          
8Stand Alone Institutions offer only diploma courses. 
9We shall discuss the quality-quantity trade-off subsequently in the chapter. 
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education supplied depends on a set of underlying conditions. If there are no faculty shortages or 
infrastructure constraints, the HEI can respond easily to a small increase in tuition fees. In 
economic jargon, the supply function for higher education will be ‘elastic’. However, when input 
constraints exist, the supply response is less flexible. In this manner, different configurations can 
be analysed. Apart from input constraints, there may be other factors that can affect the higher 
education market. This includes regulatory or policy induced requirements. As discussed above, 
there could be a ‘ban’ on fresh recruitment.  
The analytical framework delineated above can be represented in simple diagrams representing 
the higher education market. The diagrammatic analysis has been presented more fully 
elsewhere.10 We present here some key insights derived using this framework to analyse faculty 
shortage in a number of different contexts. The appropriate policy response in each of these 
contexts is very different. In some situations, what may appear as a faculty shortage is not really 
so. Measuring faculty shortage by the proportion of unfilled to sanctioned posts tends to shift the 
focus towards increasing the supply of faculty resources. However, this may not be the correct 
diagnosis of the situation in all cases. Below we present a set of hypothetical cases to illustrate the 
need for policy to be based on a careful assessment of the operating context and economic motives 
of the HEI. While faculty availability is our focus in this chapter, we should keep in mind that the 
more important policy issue is whether higher education is available in adequate quantity and 
quality.  
Case 1: Excess demand for higher education without faculty shortage in public-funded HEI 
Faculty shortage causes concern because it may prevent education services from expanding to 
meet rising demand. However, consider a situation where there is no shortage of faculty (in a 
structural sense). Demand and supply of higher education both respond to the price (tuition fees). 
The supply for higher education is elastic—i.e., the HEI can increase the supply of higher 
education by hiring additional faculty resources if needed. If the higher education market functions 
according to market principles, supply and demand would be equal at a particular equilibrium 
tuition rate. However, this may not be possible because of an upper limit on tuition fees imposed 
by government on grounds of economic accessibility. This is the effective tuition fee, and it is 
lower than the equilibrium rate. This situation will lead to an excess demand for higher education—
the supply by the HEIs will be less than the demand at the low price. Here HEIs may claim that 
they face a faculty shortage, but the real problem is that they have no economic incentive. Under 
the prevailing conditions, they would recruit more faculty resources only if salaries were lower. In 
fact, if faculty supplies are increased by policy steps to expand doctoral programs, there will be a 
downward pressure on faculty salaries and perhaps on quality as well. There is no reason to 
suppose that faculty salaries in India are too high, and therefore lowering them may not be the best 
                                                          
10The framework explained more fully in a paper by the author (Sen 2013). We shall use it here to convey some of the 
key insights that are relevant here.  The work originated from the author’s participation in the Task Force. 
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policy. The correct policy therefore would be to increase budgetary support to the HEIs to enable 
them to expand supply. This is the better way to meet the goals of affordable education together 
with quality. 
Case 2: Excess demand for higher education with faculty shortage and regulatory constraint 
Here we examine a situation where there are two additional and different types of constraints on 
the supply of education—there is a structural barrier to expanding faculty size, and a policy-
induced ‘ban’ on faculty recruitment. The structural constraint on faculty supply implies that 
beyond a point, the supply of education cannot be increased easily. This could be because potential 
teachers are attracted by alternative job opportunities, and they can only be induced to join the 
teaching profession by offering higher salaries. Thus education supply can be increased by the 
HEIs, but only at a sharply rising cost. The ceiling imposed on tuition fees remains. In this case, 
the magnitude of excess demand for higher education can be shown to depend on which of these 
three constraints is actually binding. If the faculty supply constraint is binding, then the appropriate 
policy would be to take steps to increase the supply of faculty resources. If on the other hand, it is 
the policy-induced freeze on faculty hiring that is the binding constraint, then no other policy 
intervention would ease the problem until this policy is relaxed. Further, even if both of the above 
constraints (i.e., faculty shortage and hiring freeze) are relaxed, but if the upper limit on tuition is 
binding then the excess demand for higher will still remain until the HEI receives enhanced 
funding. 
To summarize, our economic framework suggests that policy makers must (a) carefully identify 
the different potential constraints on the higher education market, and (b) establish which 
particular constraint is binding at any given time; and (c) decide on the policy step to ameliorate 
the binding constraint.  
We now apply our framework to analyse the market for faculty resources. This market is also 
subject to three influences—demand, supply and regulatory/policy norms. The demand for faculty 
resources is determined as follows. Faced with a demand for higher education, the HEI decides on 
faculty utilization so as to maximize net operating income subject to maintaining a chosen level of 
education quality and institutional reputation. The demand for faculty resources can then derived 
to be a function of the faculty salaries. If salaries fall, they would employ more faculty resources. 
If there is a rise in the demand for higher education, then the demand for faculty resources would 
also increase correspondingly.  
On the supply side, the main determinants are: faculty salaries (relative to jobs with comparable 
qualifications); service conditions (e.g. teaching workload, research opportunities); career 
advancement prospects (promotion prospects, skill upgradation opportunities); institutional 
reputation of the HEI; better post-retirement benefits; and attractive fellowship opportunities for 
PhD and post-doctoral research. These conditions comprise factors that would increase faculty 
supply over the long term by making academic careers more attractive for new entrants. In the 
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medium and short run, faculty availability can be increased by such steps as relaxation of the age 
of mandatory retirement; enabling other professionals and practitioners (who are qualified but 
whose normal jobs do not involve teaching) to teach on a part-time basis; attracting NRIs and 
international academic personnel. However, given such enabling conditions, the most effective 
determinant of supply in the short run is the faculty salary. As wages rise, up to a point faculty 
supplies would increase readily. However, after a certain level, the availability would run into a 
limit. Beyond this level further increases would require significant increase in the salary. However, 
Indian faculty salaries in public HEIs are traditionally fixed by administrative procedures. So we 
shall assume that the prevailing salary level (say W) is given. W is less than the market clearing 
equilibrium wage rate. 
Finally, regulatory norms influence the faculty market. These can be of two types—(a) those that 
set a floor on faculty positions through such norms as pupil-teacher ratios, and (b) those that set 
an upper limit to faculty positions by such mechanisms as freezing fresh hiring, or via rigidity in 
the number of sanctioned posts.  
Applying our framework to the faculty market yields the following insights. The actual faculty 
shortage is the gap between demand and supply at the administrative fixed salary W. The shortage 
would disappear if the market salary was permitted to rise. The actual shortage can be shown to 
be greater than the gap between sanctioned and actual filled posts—i.e. the traditional measure is 
inaccurate and underestimates the true economic faculty shortage. The number of actually filled 
positions is low because the fixed salary level is insufficient to elicit adequate quantity of faculty 
supply.  
If we consider a different hypothetical situation where the supply position of faculty is even more 
stringent, it is possible that at the given wage rate the quantity of faculty resources supplied in the 
market would be inadequate to meet the norm of a maximum pupil-teacher ratio. The appropriate 
policy responses in this situation would be a combination of the following—(a) in the short term 
allow the faculty wage to rise; (b) take steps to increase the short term supply of faculty; (c) initiate 
measures (noted above) to improve the long term attractiveness of academic careers. It is possible, 
however, that in this situation HEIs and policy makers may attempt to take some other actions. 
One such action is to restrict the size of enrolments by making entry requirements much more 
stringent. We observe this phenomenon occurring in the case of the popular professional 
programmes in management, engineering, medicine and law.11 Such a step would keep the demand 
for faculty resources down to manageable levels, but at the cost of unmet demand for higher 
education. The HEI might also attempt to lower the effective cost of faculty resources by increasing 
teaching loads and discouraging research and professional development activity. This strategy 
                                                          
11For example, in the Common Admission Test (CAT) to join the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs), the 
successful candidates represent approximately 1.5 per cent of the total number of applicants. 
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would, however, lead to a weakening of institutional reputation. HEIs could also adopt short term 
measures to increase faculty supply—such as ad hoc appointments. However, without adequate 
processes for certification and quality control this step may lead to lower quality. 
The economic competition for faculty resources has important structural consequences for the 
higher education sector. Economic liberalization has led to a sharp rise in the demand for those 
branches of higher education that offer prospects for high-paying jobs. This trend has reinforced 
the commercialization of higher education by making very high tuition fees feasible and acceptable 
in certain disciplines. Consequently, the salaries that faculty members in these disciplines can 
command have risen relative to the teachers in other traditional disciplines. Private sector HEIs 
have entered such segments of the higher education market. In some cases, they offer higher 
salaries to teachers whose skills are in short supply relative to the demand. In large established 
Indian public universities it is difficult if not impossible to have differential salaries for different 
groups of faculties. This process has contributed to the institutional fragmentation of the higher 
education sector, and explains the emergence of highly specialized and smaller universities. 
Moreover, the new private HEIs have a strong incentive to ‘poach’ senior faculty members away 
from the older universities. The latter are consequently weakened through such a process. Thus 
the intensified commercialization of higher education under conditions of excess demand 
heightens institutional competition. Because the competition does not occur in a level playing field, 
it has a differentiating impact on the higher education system. Private HEIs operate with a much 
greater degree of economic autonomy—they are able to engage in commercial cherry picking. 
Consequently, they often offer a narrower range of programmes and courses. The strong reliance 
on net operating surplus of the commercialised private HEIs keeps them focused on revenue 
earning. However, this also implies that they do not have the capacity to build institutional 
reputation. On the other end of the organizational spectrum, the public HEIs have a bigger social 
mission and less operational flexibility which restricts their ability to commercialize, and pay 
higher salaries to their faculty resources. Hence, their faculty resource acquisition and retention 
strategies must rely on non-pecuniary incentives—such as high reputation, better working 
environment and research opportunities. 
Our analysis from an economic perspective, thus, suggests that commercialization would 
exacerbate the fragmentation and differentiation within the higher education system. The 
commercially oriented institutions would tend to stretch limited faculty resources by focusing on 
fee-paying courses and high student intakes and heavy teaching loads. The public-funded 
universities (which typically receive limited funding from government) would be under pressure 
to increase student intakes particularly of those students who cannot pay high tuition fees. 
However, with adverse salary differentials they would find it difficult to have adequate faculty in 
the disciplines and programmes that are in high demand. Both these types of institutions would 
face challenges in maintaining quality. Under such conditions well-intentioned regulatory norms 
aimed at maintaining quality (such as pupil-teacher ratios, and adequate infrastructure) might be 
evaded. As we have seen above, many regulatory bodies expressed their inability to adequately 
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implement their decisions, mainly because HEIs have an incentive to evade them while the 
regulators’ resources are limited. 
Conclusion 
The Task Force made a set of comprehensive recommendations which should be adopted. These 
were grouped under the following heads: (1) Administrative Reforms, (2) Academic Reforms, (3) 
Financial Reforms and (4) Miscellaneous Reforms. Among the administrative reforms, it 
recommended that each HEI should establish a Faculty Induction and Development Cell. It also 
suggested ways to establish procedures and standards for different categories of non-permanent 
faculty members. These include those who are hired on contract, guest faculty members, adjunct 
faculty, visiting faculty, distinguished mentor faculty and international adjunct faculty. Under 
academic reforms, there are suggestions for institutionalizing schemes for inducing younger 
professionals to academic careers, and award schemes for excellent teachers. Among the financial 
reforms, the Task Force proposed honorariums for the time that faculty members devote to 
sponsored research, and establishing externally endowed chair professorships. The miscellaneous 
category included the setting up of a web portal for greater information dissemination that would 
help academic career aspirants. 
While these recommendations are very useful, we have highlighted here the implications for 
faculty resources of significant variations in the focus and functioning of different categories of 
HEIs. It is desirable that the differentiation and fragmentation of the HEI system should be kept 
within some reasonable limits. Our analysis above suggests that while appropriate steps to increase 
the availability of faculty resources are desirable, a broader policy approach is necessary. In 
essence, this would entail ensuring mechanisms for enabling (and encouraging) the HEIs to attain 
a better balance between the two objectives of adequate net income and institutional reputation. 
At the moment the different types of HEIs pursue objectives that are highly skewed because their 
operating environment does not incentivize them to seek a better balance. A better balance between 
the two goals would narrow the sharp differences in faculty resource strategies. In the case of both 
private HEIs as well as public HEIs, policy should encourage the creation of some type of 
endowment fund. Such a fund can be crucial in enabling them to focus on and invest in building 
institutional reputation. This long term goal may be relegated under pressures to increase student 
enrolments and/or to raise financial resources. An important component of institutional reputation 
is creating and maintaining a good work environment for faculty, adequate opportunities for 
research and professional development. Additional regulatory steps and mechanisms such rewards 
based on objective performance criteria may be needed to channel competition among HEIs 
towards building institutional reputation. In the case of public HEIs, it is very important to increase 
their financial autonomy—by enabling steps that would encourage them to build a strong corpus 
funds from the savings that they earn. They should be adequately incentivized to fulfil their larger 
social mandates, without their having to compromise on quality and reputation.  
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In many ways, such enabling conditions are evident in such institutions as IIMs and IITs. They are 
publicly funded have acquired the reputation and also been allowed the academic autonomy that 
enables them to have a good faculty management processes. The issue of tuition fees and 
accessibility remains a cause for concern in such cases, and this needs concurrent attention. They 
are able to attract and retain faculty resources in the face of stiff domestic and international 
competition. Among the private HEIs as well, we find exceptional institutions where institutional 
reputation is accorded importance. Hence, the problem cannot be attributed to a simple private 
sector-public sector dualism. Indeed some of the great universities of the world are private. There 
is, however, no easy way out. The faculty availability problem requires calibrated short-term, 
medium term and long term policy responses, as well as adequate financial resources.  
17 
 
References 
Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD). (2009). The Pay Committee for Faculty and 
Scientific/Design Staff of Central Technical Institutes (Goverdhan Mehta Committee 
Report). New Delhi: Government of India. 
Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD). (2011). Report of the Task Force on Faculty 
Shortage and Design of Performance Appraisal System (S.G. Dhande Committee Report). 
New Delhi: Government of India. 
Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD). (2015). All India Survey on Higher 
Education (AISHE), 2013-14. Department of Higher Education. New Delhi: Government 
of India. 
Sen, Chiranjib (2013). A Framework for Analysing Demand and Supply of Faculty and the Quality 
of Higher Education. Journal of Educational Planning and Administration, 27(3), July 
2013, pp 281-309 
University Grants Commission (UGC). (2008). The Committee to Review Pay Scales and Service 
Conditions of University and College Teachers (G.K. Chaddha Committe Report). New 
Delhi: Government of India. 
 
 
